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ABSTRACT
In this Article, I make an argument that the state, including the
Government of India, is empowered by the Constitution of India to
decide which classes qualify as “backward classes” for affirmative
action measures under the Constitution. The Supreme Court of
India has directed the government to include the transgender popu-
lation as a backward class and to extend to them affirmative action
measures such as reservation in public appointments and university
admissions. In response, the Union of India has filed a clarification
petition stating that it is incompetent to suo motu include the trans-
gender population as a backward class and that it can only do so
upon the recommendation of the National Commission for Backward
Classes (NCBC). This Article is a response to the Union’s clarification
petition and it seeks to show that constitutionally, the competence to
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add a community to the backward class list lies with the State author-
ities such as the Government of India, and any suggestion to the
contrary is an incorrect reading of the Constitution. As this clarifi-
cation petition is still pending in court, this Article seeks to inform
the view taken on this subject by both the legal system and scholars.
INTRODUCTION: THE CLARIFICATION PETITION
On April 15, 2014, the Supreme Court of India, in the case of
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Others, stated
that transgender1 persons have a right to be recognized in their self-
identified gender (male, female, or third gender) and are entitled to
the full protection of the right to equality, privacy, autonomy, and
dignity as enumerated in the chapter on fundamental rights in the
Constitution of India.2 The Supreme Court also directed the Central
1. The remainder of this Article will use the broad definition of “transgender” adopted
by the Supreme Court of India, which includes the Hijra population and other regional
identities such as Aravanis, Jogti, Jogappa, etc. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth. v. Union of India,
(2014) 5 SCC 438, 462. The Court explained:
Transgender is generally described as an umbrella term for persons whose
gender identity, gender expression or behavior does not conform to their bio-
logical sex. TG may also take in persons who do not identify with their sex
assigned at birth, which include [H]ijras/[E]unuchs who, in this writ petition,
describe themselves as “third gender” and they do not identify as either male
or female. Hijras are not men by virtue of anatomy appearance and psycho-
logically, they are also not women, though they are like women with no female
reproduction organ and no menstruation. Since [H]ijras do not have repro-
duction capacities as either men or women, they are neither men nor women
and claim to be an institutional “third gender.”
Id. It must be noted that within the community itself, the word “transgender” and “Hijra”
do not have the same meaning: a Hijra is a transgender person who is initiated into a
socio-religious tradition with specific rules and regulations. See, e.g., id. at 480–81. If a
person self-identifies as transgender but not Hijra, they are not a part of the Hijra socio-
religious tradition. See id. The Supreme Court adopted the following definition of Hijras:
Hijras are biological males who reject their ‘masculine’ identity in due
course of time to identify either as women, or “not-men,” or “in-between man
and woman,” or “neither man nor woman.” Hijras can be considered as the
western equivalent of transgender/transsexual (male-to-female) persons but
[H]ijras have a long tradition/culture and have strong social ties formalised
through a ritual called “reet” (becoming a member of Hijra community).
There are regional variations in the use of terms referred to [H]ijras. For ex-
ample, Kinnars (Delhi) and Aravanis (Tamil Nadu). Hijras may earn through
their traditional work: ‘badhai’ (clapping their hands and asking for alms),
blessing newborn-babies, or dancing in ceremonies. Some proportion of Hijras
engage in sex work for lack of other job opportunities, while some may be
self-employed or work for non-governmental organisations.
Id.
2. Id. at 447; see also INDIA CONST. arts. 12–35 (including the right to equality, the
right to freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to freedom of religion, etc.). A 
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and State Governments to treat transgender persons as socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens and to extend to them
reservations in admissions to educational institutions and appoint-
ments to public posts.3
On July 30, 2014, the Union of India4 filed an application for
clarification,5 (“Clarification Petition”) regarding the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case. In the Clarification
complete list of all the directions issued by the Supreme Court to the Centre, and the
state governments with respect to transgender and Hijra persons, is as follows:
[I]t is declared that: (1) Hijras, Eunuchs, apart from binary gender, be
treated as “third gender” for the purpose of safeguarding their rights under
Part III of our Constitution and the laws made by Parliament and the State
Legislature.
(2) Transgender persons’ right to decide their self-identified gender is also
upheld and the Centre and State Governments are directed to grant legal
recognition of their gender identity such as male, female or as third gender.
(3) We direct the Centre and the State Governments to take steps to treat
them as Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of citizens and extend
all kinds of reservation in cases of admission in educational institutions and
for public appointments.
(4) The Centre and State Governments are directed to operate separate HIV
serosurveillance centres since [H]ijras/[T]ransgenders face several sexual
health issues.
(5) The Centre and State Governments should seriously address the prob-
lems being faced by [H]ijras/[T]ransgenders such as fear, shame, gender dys-
phoria, social pressure, depression, suicidal tendencies, social stigma, etc.
and any insistence for SRS for declaring one’s gender is immoral and illegal.
(6) The Centre and State Governments should take proper measures to
provide medical care to TGs in the hospitals and also provide them separate
public toilets and other facilities.
(7) The Centre and State Governments should also take steps for framing
various social welfare schemes for their betterment.
(8) The Centre and State Governments should take steps to create public
awareness so that TGs will feel that they are also part and parcel of the social
life and be not treated as untouchables.
(9) The Centre and the State Governments should also take measures to
regain their respect and place in the society which once they enjoyed in our
cultural and social life.
Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 455–56.
3. Id. at 508.
4. When the Executive Branch of the State is sued in court, it is sued in the name
of the “Union of India.” The Executive Branch of the State is called the Government of
India. The words “Government of India” and “State” are used interchangeably only for
the purposes of this Article. Generally, the word “State” carries a wider meaning in the
Constitution of India. See INDIA CONST. art. 12 (“In this Part, unless the context otherwise
requires, ‘the State’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government
and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the ter-
ritory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”).
5. Application for Clarification/Modification of Judgment and Order Dated 15.04.2014
Passed by This Hon’ble Court and to Pass Appropriate Directions on Behalf of Union of
India, Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth. v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438, http://orinam.net
/content/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/NALSA_UOI.pdf [http://perma.cc/DWQ4-FNHT]
[hereinafter Clarification Petition].
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Petition, the Union argues, among other things, that the State does
not have the authority to suo motu include transgender persons as
a socially and educationally backward class as required by the Su-
preme Court.6 To quote the Union of India, “[F]or inclusion of trans-
gender as OBCs, the matter has to be first referred to the National
Commission of Backward Classes.” 7
Although the meaning of the term “backward classes” will be
explained in detail for completeness in the latter portion of this
Article,8 here it is important to lay down what it means to be in-
cluded as a backward class. The backward class list is a list prepared
by the State.9 Classes and communities present on this list are eli-
gible for various State affirmative action measures such as job
reservations and quotas in college admission.10
The Union of India argues that if transgender persons are to be
included in the list of backward classes, the NCBC must direct the
it to do so, and the Government of India cannot suo motu include the
transgender communities as a backward class.11 The aim of this
Article is to demonstrate how the Union’s argument is based not
only on an incorrect reading of the law, but is also mala fide.
I. INCORRECT READING OF THE LAW
The NCBC was constituted by the National Commission for Back-
ward Classes Act of 1993 (“Act”) upon the direction of the Supreme
Court in the case of Sawhney v. Union of India.12 As per Section 9
of the Act:
Function of the Commission: The Commission shall examine re-
quests for inclusion of any class of citizens as a backward class in
the lists and hear complaints of over-inclusion or under-inclusion
of any backward class in such lists and tender such advice to the
Central Government as it deems appropriate.13
6. Id. at 13, 20.
7. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). “OBC” stands for “Other Backward Classes,” and is a
category within the backward classes.
8. See supra Part IV.
9. National Commission for Backward Classes Act, No. 27 of 1993, INDIA CODE (1993),
ch. I, § 2(a).
10. See id. § 2(c).
11. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 20–21.
12. Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217. In Sawhney, the Court
explained the law on the reservation system in India in the context of a government
memorandum that provided for 27% reservation in public appointments for socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens and 10% reservation in public appointments
for the economically poor. Id. at 219.
13. National Commission for Backward Classes Act ch. III, § 9 (alteration in original)
(emphasis added).
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The NCBC is thus empowered to decide whether a particular
community merits a place in the list of backward classes. It is to be
noted that Section 9(1) of the Act does not empower the NCBC to
make the list; as per the Act, it is the Government of India that is
empowered to make this list.14 Indeed Section 2(c) of the Act clari-
fies this provision:
“Lists” means lists prepared by the Government of India from
time to time for purposes of making provision for the reservation
of appointments or posts in favour of backward classes of citi-
zens which, in the opinion of that Government, are not ade-
quately represented in the services under the Government of
India and any local or other authority within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India . . . .15
The Union of India, therefore, misreads Section 9 of the Act when
it argues, “[I]t will not be proper to classify all transgender persons
and group them as ‘Other Backward Classes’ suo motu.”16
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE STATE (INCLUDING
THE GOVERNMENT) TO ENACT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MEASURES
CANNOT BE STRIPPED BY THE JUDICIARY OR THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR BACKWARD CLASSES
The Constitution empowers the State to include a particular
class within the backward class list: this constitutional competence
is found, most directly, in Article 16(4) and Article 15(4) of the
Constitution.17 Article 16(4) of the Constitution states that the State
can, either by executive order (for example, a government notifica-
tion) or law,18 make provisions for job reservations for backward
classes of citizens.19
Similarly, Article 15(4) of the Constitution states that the State
can, either by executive order (for example, a government notifica-
tion) or law,20 make provisions for the advancement of socially and
14. Id. at ch. I, § 2(c).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 20 (emphasis added).
17. INDIA CONST. arts. 16(4), 15(4).
18. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 688.
19. INDIA CONST. art. 16(4) (“Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
services under the State.”) (emphasis added).
20. In the case of Sawhney, the Court noted the use of the word “provision,” rather
than “law,” in Article 16(4) of the Constitution is significant. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3
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educationally backward classes of citizens and Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes.21 To be sure, the Supreme Court has directed
the State that, “[T]here ought to be a permanent body, in the nature
of a Commission or Tribunal, to which complaints of wrong inclusion
or non-inclusion of groups, classes and sections in the lists of Other
Backward Classes can be made.”22 The Court itself has acknowledged
that, “Strictly speaking, appointment of a Commission under Article
34023 is not necessary to identify the other backward classes. . . . The
Government could have, even without appointing a Commission,
specified the OBCs, on the basis of such material as it may have had
before it . . . .” 24
The appointment of a commission, therefore, does not strip the
State of the power to identify socially and educationally backward
classes under Article 15(4) or backward classes under Article 16(4).
It is a body constituted for purely administrative efficiency because
it is well versed in sociological research on the question of backward-
ness. True, “[t]he advice of the [NCBC] shall ordinarily be binding
upon the Central Government,” 25 however, the government (and
other state bodies) is free to depart from the recommendation of the
NCBC. On this matter, the Supreme Court has held, “Where . . . the
Government does not agree with [the NCBC’s] recommendation, it
must record its reasons therefor.” 26 This is because neither the
judiciary nor the NCBC can take away a power of the State given to
it by the Constitution.27
The judiciary can only interpret the power granting provisions
of the Constitution so that State action is within constitutional
SCC at 688. The word “law” has been used in other parts of the Constitution. The Court
noted that this deliberate departure from the word “law” in Article 16(4) meant that the
Constitution makers wanted to empower the government of the day to regulate service
conditions through orders and rules. Id. This was a well-known practice at the time of
the framing of the Constitution. Id. In Article 15(4), the Constitution departs from the
word “law” and states that the State can make “provisions” for socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens. Id. Applying the reasoning of the Sawhney Court, the gov-
ernment can, even by a notification, make any provision (and not just reservation) for
the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.
21. INDIA CONST. art. 15(4) (“Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall
prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially
and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.”) (emphasis added).
22. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 756.
23. INDIA CONST. art. 340 (empowering the President to appoint a Commission to in-
vestigate the conditions of the backward classes).
24. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 763 (emphasis added).
25. National Commission for Backward Classes Act, No. 27 of 1993, INDIA CODE (1993),
ch. III, § 9.
26. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 756.
27. See INDIA CONST. art. 15(4).
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limits. It can also invalidate a State action if the State transgresses
the limits of the Constitution. However, it would require nothing short
of a constitutional amendment if the power to prescribe the list of
backward classes is shifted from the State (including the govern-
ment of the day) to a commission.28
Article 14 of the Constitution of India provides, “The State shall
not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection
of the laws within the territory of India.” 29 It has always been an
accepted tenet of constitutional interpretation that “equality” means
“equality among equals.” 30 It is this principle that allows the State
to classify people into different groups and treat them in a different
manner if they are not equally placed in society.31 It is also this
principle that allows the State to install affirmative action measures
for one group so that the playing field can be leveled.32 Articles 15 and
16 are but an “incident of [the] guarantee of equality contained in
Article 14,” 33 an “instance” 34 of the equality guarantee of the Consti-
tution. It is from Article 14 itself that the constitutional competence
to provide affirmative action measures arises. This position has also
been clearly acknowledged by the Supreme Court in National Legal
Services Authority v. Union of India: “Article 14 of the Constitution
also ensures equal protection and hence a positive obligation on the
State to ensure equal protection of laws by bringing in necessary so-
cial and economic changes, so that everyone including TGs may enjoy
equal protection of laws and nobody is denied such protection.” 35
This is the principle of substantive equality also called the prin-
ciple of “effective material equality” by Justice Mathew in State of
Kerala v. Thomas.36 As Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman explain,
this “substantive approach to equality would interpret discrimina-
tion in terms of whether the treatment of a particular group of persons
contributed to their historic and systemic subordination . . . .” 37 The
Constitution places a duty on the State to keep in mind historical
disadvantage at the time of preparing schemes and laws. In other
words, the obligation of the State to ensure equality is not only an
28. See National Commission for Backward Classes Act, ch. III, § 11.
29. INDIA CONST. art. 14 (emphasis added).
30. See MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 49–50 (12th
ed. 2013).
31. See id. at 49.
32. See id. at 48.
33. Kerala v. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310, 331.
34. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 691.
35. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 487 (emphasis added).
36. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC at 347.
37. RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS
WITH LAW IN INDIA 178 (1996).
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obligation to identify that two groups are positioned differently but
also to ensure that the laws it enacts places these two groups on a
level playing field to compete for opportunities.38 The Constitution
has empowered the State to do this under Articles 14–16 as also
recognized by the Supreme Court in National Legal Services Author-
ity v. Union of India.39 The Union of India, therefore, misreads the
Constitution when it argues in the clarification petition, “[F]or inclu-
sion of transgender as OBCs, the matter has to be first referred to
the National Commission for Backward Classes.” 40
The State is empowered by Article 14 and most certainly by
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) to suo motu decide whether the transgender
communities should be included within the backward classes. The
State is only required to consult the NCBC at the time it is revising
its list of backward classes. This is expressly stated in Section 11 of
the Act:
Periodic revision of lists by the Central Government—
(1) The Central Government may at any time, and shall, at the
expiration of ten years from the coming into force of this Act and
every succeeding period of ten years thereafter, undertake revi-
sion of the lists with a view to excluding from such lists those
classes who have ceased to be backward classes or for including
in such lists new backward classes.
(2) The Central Government shall, while undertaking any revi-
sion referred to in subsection (1), consult the Commission.41
For the reasons explained above, the NCBC cannot compel the State
to include or exclude a particular community from the list. Indeed,
this was the very argument made by the government in the case of
Singh v. Union of India.42
III. MALA FIDE PETITION
On March 4, 2014, the Government of India published a notifi-
cation in the Gazette of India that included the Jat43 community on
the Central List of Backward Classes for a number of States.44 This
38. See SINGH, supra note 30, at 48.
39. INDIA CONST. arts. 14–16; Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 508.
40. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 21.
41. National Commission for Backward Classes Act, No. 27 of 1993, INDIA CODE
(1993), ch. III, § 11.
42. Singh v. Union of India, (2015) 4 SCC 697, 712.
43. A subsection of the Hindus.
44. Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment Resolution, 2014, Gazette of India,
sec. 1 (Mar. 4, 2014).
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meant that for central services in these states, the Jat community
was to be treated as a backward class, allowing for job reservations
and other provisions enacted in their favor. By doing so, the Govern-
ment of India acted contrary to the advice tendered by the NCBC.45
On June 4, 2013, the Prime Minister constituted a Group of Minis-
ters “[t]o interact with the representatives of the Jat community
with regard to their demand for inclusion and to keep them apprised
of the progress in the matter.” 46
This Group of Ministers requested the counsel of the NCBC and
upon receiving advice that the Jat community is neither socially nor
educationally backward and adequately represented in public em-
ployment and should not be included in the list of backward classes,
rejected it.47 It is important to note that when the gazette notifica-
tion was published on March 9, 2014, the United Progressive Alli-
ance government was in power at the center; the new government,
the National Democratic Alliance headed by the Bharatiya Janta
Party which took oath on May 26, 2014, has continued to defend this
reservation and the gazette notification, which is evidenced from the
fact that oral arguments in the present case took place on several
dates in November and December 2014.48
The petitioners, Ram Singh and others, challenged this inclu-
sion of the Jat community in the list of backward classes.49 They
argued that the government decision was not based on any “relevant
quantifiable data or material” 50 and was “wholly unsupported by
any adequate, reasonable and relevant grounds or basis.” 51
In response to this challenge, the Attorney General of India has,
on behalf of the Union, argued that:
[T]he power to make provisions for reservation by inclusion of the
eligible classes in the Central Lists flow from Article 16(4) of the
Constitution. The advice of NCBC . . . would not be very mate-
rial inasmuch as even dehors the provisions of the NCBC Act the
Union Government would not be denuded of its powers to add or
subtract from the Central Lists of Other Backward Classes.52
45. Singh, (2015) 4 SCC at 705.
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 708.
48. Oral arguments commenced on November 26, and continued on December 3, 4, 6,
11, 16, and 17, 2014. Detailed date-wise court orders are available at courtnic.nic.in/su
premecourt/casestatus_new/caseno_new_alt.asp (Case No. Writ Petition (Civil) 274/2014).
49. Singh, (2015) 4 SCC at 705.
50. Id. at 712.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
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After perusal of the State Commission reports, extant litera-
ture, the relevant report from the expert committee of the Indian
Council for Social Science Research, and the NCBC recommendation,
the Supreme Court decided that the NCBC had sufficient material
to recommend the non-inclusion of Jats on the backward class list.53
The Supreme Court found that the Jat community was a politically
organized community and did not fit the criteria of backwardness
contemplated by the Constitution.54 Although the government did
not win this case, it is important to note the ground on which the
Supreme Court decision was based. The Court found the govern-
ment’s decision to include the Jat community in the list legally
fragile and unreasonable.55 The decision was not based on the fact
that the Central Government did not have the power to create such
a list; indeed, the Court acknowledged, “[u]ndoubtedly, Article 16(4)
confers such a power on the Union . . . .” 56
The Union of India argues two contradictory principles: on the
one hand, it claims that it is disempowered to include any commu-
nity in the list of backward classes without the recommendation of
the NCBC (the argument in the Clarification Petition).57 On the
other hand, eight months later, it includes a community in the list
of backward classes disregarding the recommendation of the NCBC
on the ground that Article 16(4) of the Constitution gives it the
competence to do so and that the NCBC cannot denude it of these
powers.58 The Union has changed its legal stance in two different
cases within the span of a few months. This demonstrates that it is
not taking a position on law but through the backward class argu-
ment is betraying a political unwillingness to deny, or at least post-
pone, the inclusion of transgender communities in the backward
class list.
IV. THE CLARIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED
WITH THE RESERVATION DEBATE
At this juncture, it may be fitting to provide a brief overview of
the law with respect to special provisions and affirmative action for
backward classes, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes in India.
Article 15(4) empowers the State to make special provisions for
53. Id. at 728, 730.
54. Id. at 730.
55. See Singh, (2015) 4 SCC at 712.
56. Id. at 726.
57. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 13, 20.
58. Singh, (2015) 4 SCC at 708, 712.
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socially and educationally backward classes of citizens,59 and Article
16(4) empowers the State to make reservations for appointment to
posts for the backward classes of India.60
The terms “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes” are not
defined anywhere in the Constitution. Articles 34161 and 34262 of the
Constitution of India empower the President to appoint a commis-
sion to prepare a list of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
As this Article deals with the inclusion of transgender persons in the
backward class list, I will not explore the terms “Scheduled Castes”
and “Scheduled Tribes” in detail. I will, however, at the end of this
section, bring out the differences between being classified as either
“Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribe” or “Backward Class.”
The term “backward class,” although used in the Constitution,
has not been defined anywhere. The question of the identification
of a backward class has been a long and troubling one for the judi-
ciary and the State but the position was settled by the Court in
Sawhney v. Union of India.63 This case conclusively laid down the
law relating to reservation in India. The Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes are certainly a part of the backward classes within
the Constitution.64 The Court has left the procedure for the final
identification of a backward class to state-appointed authorities but
has given some broad guidelines for it.65
The Court has stated that caste alone cannot be an identifier of
a backward class.66 Among Hindus, the court has noted that one is
born into a caste and the caste, in most cases, at least in rural India,
dictates the profession one follows: “Its social status and standing
59. INDIA CONST. art. 15(4).
60. INDIA CONST. art. 16(4).
61. INDIA CONST. art. 341(1):
The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where
it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notifica-
tion, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes,
races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed
to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the
case may be.
62. INDIA CONST. art. 342(1):
The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where
it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notifica-
tion, specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within
tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of this Constitution
be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or Union territory,
as the case may be.
63. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 766–67.
64. Id. at 716.
65. See id. at 717.
66. Id. at 446.
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depends upon the nature of the occupation followed by it. Lowlier
the occupation, lowlier the social standing of the class in the graded
hierarchy.” 67 Even if one ceases to follow the caste occupation, “the
label remains.” 68 The backwardness contemplated by Article 16(4)
is social backwardness, and the Court has held that caste, occupa-
tion, poverty, and social backwardness are closely entwined.69
To be sure, the Constitution prohibits any discrimination based
solely on caste.70 The State, therefore, cannot provide job reserva-
tions or special provisions based on caste alone. However, once caste
fulfills the criteria of backwardness devised by the State, it is no
longer just a “caste” but a “backward class,” and the Constitution
does allow special provisions and job reservations to be made in
favor of “backward classes.” 71 Moreover, caste can just be a starting
point to determine social backwardness, and social backwardness
can also be determined without reference to caste.72 This can be
done by looking at occupational groups, denominations, and sects
that have been historically disadvantaged and socially backward.73
This broad categorization of backward classes is capable of encom-
passing persons from all religions, with or without a caste system,
and groups such as transgender persons who have, because of a
history of discrimination, remained socially backward.74 Addition-
ally, for the purposes of special provisions under Article 15(4), the
backward class must not only be socially backward, but also educa-
tionally backward.75 Once again, the criteria to determine educa-
tional backwardness are left to the State.76
The Court has stated that the thrust of the test to determine
backwardness is to determine if the class is considered socially
backward.77 Social backwardness can be alleviated by economic
prosperity or educational advancement.78 The Court has stated that
once a person advances so much economically and educationally
that the thread that connects them to their backwardness “snaps,”
the person is no longer eligible for affirmative action measures.79
67. Id. at 714.
68. Id.
69. See Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 769.
70. INDIA CONST. art. 15(1).
71. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 718.
72. Id. at 250, 255–56.
73. Id. at 716.
74. Id. at 716–17.
75. Id. at 669.
76. See INDIA CONST. art. 15(4) (stating that nothing prevents the State “from making
any special provision for” educationally backward classes).
77. See Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 568.
78. See id. at 724.
79. Id.
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Usually, income cannot be the sole determinant of this advancement
because the amount of income necessary to overcome poverty and
backwardness is a question that varies from state to state.80 More-
over, there can be situations in which the income level of a person
may not be exceedingly high but their social status has risen so
much that they can no longer benefit from State affirmative action,
such as the children of Indian Administrative Service Officers.81
These persons are called the “creamy layer” and they must be ex-
cluded to determine the “true” backward class.82 The Court has di-
rected the Government of India to make the final determination of
the criteria for identifying the creamy layer.83 The criteria must be
such that the creamy layer can be said to have emerged from social
backwardness.84 The Court stated, in a later case, that Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes cannot be excluded by the creamy
layer test.85
There cannot be reservation of more than fifty percent of jobs
and educational institutions except in the most exceptional cases.86
The Court has also stated that reservation would not be advisable
in the following sectors:
(1) Defence Services including all technical posts therein but ex-
cluding civil posts. (2) All technical posts in establishments en-
gaged in Research and Development including those connected
with atomic energy and space and establishments engaged in pro-
duction of defence equipment. (3) Teaching posts of Professors—
and above, if any. (4) Posts in super-specialities in Medicine,
engineering and other scientific and technical subjects. (5) Posts
of pilots (and co-pilots) in the Indian Airlines and Air India.87
In addition, reservation may not be given in other posts where
the Government of India may find that the job requires the “highest
level of intelligence, skill and excellence,” 88 and it may be not in the
interest of “efficiency of administration” to make a reservation in
these posts.89
80. See id. (noting that income is impacted by geographic location and the urban or
rural nature of the place where individuals might live).
81. Id. at 724–25.
82. Id. at 725.
83. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 725.
84. Id.
85. Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1, 511–13.
86. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 735.
87. Id. at 752.
88. Id. at 753.
89. Id.
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Subsequent constitutional amendments have empowered the
State to make provisions for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes and for the backward classes with respect to admission to edu-
cational institutions—even private and unaided education institu-
tions—with the exclusion of minority educational institutions.90 The
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have reservations in job
promotions in State services as well.91 Unfulfilled seats reserved for
one year can be carried forward to the next year and do not count
toward the fifty percent reservation limit.92
Every state or central government authority is free to devise
guidelines to determine a backward class.93 However, the broad set
of guidelines adopted by the NCBC for determining whether a class
has been rightly included or wrongly excluded from the list of back-
ward classes were devised by the government-appointed Mandal
Commission for Backward Classes.94 The guidelines are as follows:
A. Social (i) Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by
others. (ii) Castes/Classes which mainly depend on manual labour
for their livelihood. (iii) Castes/ Classes where at least 25%
females and 10% males above the State average get married at
an age below 17 years in rural areas and at least 10% females and
5% males do so in urban areas. (iv) Castes/Classes where partici-
pation of females is [sic] work in [sic] at least 25% above the
State average.
B. Educational (v) Castes/Classes where the number of children in
the age group of 5–15 years who never attended school is at least
25% above the State average. (vi) Castes/Classes where the rate
of student drop-out in the age group of 5–15 years is at least 25%
above the State average. (vii) Castes/Classes amongst whom the
proportion of matriculates is at least 25% below the State average.
C. Economic (viii) Castes/Classes where the average value of
family assets is at least 25% below the State average. (ix) Castes/
Classes where the number of families living in Kutcha houses is
at least 25% above the State average. (x) Castes/Classes where
the source of drinking water is beyond half a kilometer for more
than 50% of the households. (xi) Castes/Classes where the num-
ber of households having taken consumption loan is at least 25%
above the State average.95
90. INDIA CONST. art. 15(5).
91. INDIA CONST. art. 16(4A).
92. INDIA CONST. art. 16(4B).
93. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 639–40.
94. Id. at 640.
95. Id. at 645–46.
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Each social indicator is given three points; each educational
indicator is given two points; and each economic indicator is given
one point.96 All the indicators total up to twenty-two points.97 Any
community that scores less than eleven points on this scale is con-
sidered backward.98
To be sure, the reservation debate is far from over. Should the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes be excluded from the
“creamy layer”? Should seats be reserved for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes when it comes to job promotions? Should unful-
filled vacancies be carried forward to the next year so that more than
fifty percent of the seats in a given year are reserved? Should reser-
vations be allowed in post graduate medical courses as they now
are? These and other questions are in the future of this debate.
Neither the Clarification Petition nor this Article are about the res-
ervation debate. The Union is not debating whether transgender
persons qualify for reservation. The Union is only making an argu-
ment that it is not within their competence to include these commu-
nities in the backward class list without the NCBC recommending
such action.
V. TRANSGENDER PERSONS CAN BE CATEGORIZED AS BACKWARD
CLASSES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Transgender persons face “[s]ocial exclusion and discrimina-
tion” 99 in the Indian society. They are stigmatized for their gender
identity and are also subjected to abuse both at their homes and in
public places.100 They face custodial violence and abuse at places such
as the police station.101 They are not allowed to enter malls, restau-
rants, workplaces, schools, etcetera.102 They are collectively called
by such derogatory epithets such as chakka (which in sentiment
96. Id. at 646.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 483; see PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES, Human Rights Violations Against Sexual Minorities in India, 32–33 (Feb.
2001), http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Gender/2003/sexual-minorities.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2EZH-TEYS] (reporting that different sections of the sexual minority communities face
varying degrees of rejection and discrimination); see also Siddharth Narrain, Crystallising
Queer Politics—The Naz Foundation Case and Its Implications for India’s Transgender
Communities, 2 NUJS L. REV. 445, 463–64 (2009) (stating that sexual minority commu-
nities are discriminated against by society and remain isolated).
100. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 442–43, 461–62, 487, 503 (citing, inter
alia, affidavits of Laxmi Narayan Tripathy and Siddhart Narrain).
101. Id. at 446, 487; see also Jayalakshmi v. State of Tamil Nadu, 4 MLJ 849, W.A. No.
1130 of 2006 (Madras HC, Oct. 7, 2007).
102. See Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 459.
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means a eunuch).103 Because of this treatment, education and liveli-
hood are real challenges for them. To quote the observations of the
Supreme Court on this point:
Sexual assault, including molestation, rape, forced anal and oral
sex, gang rape and stripping is being committed with impunity
and there are reliable statistics and materials to support such
activities. Further, non-recognition of identity of hijras/transgender
persons results in them facing extreme discrimination in all
spheres of society, especially in the field of employment, educa-
tion, healthcare, etc. Hijras/transgender persons face huge discrim-
ination in access to public spaces like restaurants, cinemas, shops,
malls, etc.104
Such acts as well as Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is the
source of grave harassment for transgender and Hijra persons. Be-
cause of their visible gender non-conformity they are often arrested
and harassed in police stations on the assumption that they are
violating Section 377 (criminalizing carnal intercourse as against
the order of nature).105 Although even the Supreme Court has not
been able to provide a list of acts which may be against the order of
nature, sex with persons of the same sex is considered against the
order of nature.106 Under the British Rule such acts were criminalized
under the Criminal Tribes Act 1871 as it was assumed that the
individuals engaged in these acts were “addicted to the systematic
commission of non-bailable offences . . . .”107
After noting that these communities have been systematically
stigmatized and excluded, the Supreme Court concluded that
transgender persons qualify under the definition of socially and
educationally backward classes as their backwardness is truly social
in nature and rooted in the social stigma associated with them.108
The Supreme Court stated that the State was under a positive
obligation to make special provisions for them and to provide them
103. Id. at 461 (quoting affidavit of Laxmi Narayan Tripathy).
104. Id. at 487.
105. Section 377 states: “Unnatural offences.—Whoever voluntarily has carnal inter-
course against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished
with [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” PEN. CODE § 377 (1860). See
also Priyadarshini Thangarajah & Ponni Arasu, Queer Women and the Law in India, in
LAW LIKE LOVE: QUEER PERSPECTIVES ON LAW 325, 328–29, 333 (Arvind Narrain & Alok
Gupta eds., 2011).
106. Koushal v. Naz Found., (2014) 1 SCC 1, 65–66 (India).
107. Criminal Tribes Act, INDIA CODE Part I, § 2 (1871) (repealed 1949).
108. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 455–56.
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with reservations in education and in job appointments under Arti-
cle 15(4) and 16(4) respectively:
TGs have . . . not been afforded special provisions envisaged
under Article 15(4) for the advancement of the socially and
educationally backward classes (SEBCs) of citizens, which they
are, and hence legally entitled and eligible to get the benefits of
SEBCs. The State is bound to take some affirmative action for
their advancement so that the injustice done to them for centu-
ries could be remedied. . . . TGs have also been denied rights
under Article 16(2) and discriminated against in respect of
employment or office under the State on the ground of sex. TGs
are also entitled to reservation in the matter of appointment, as
envisaged under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. The State is
bound to take affirmative action to give them due representation
in public services.109
In the case of Singh v. Union of India,110 the social backward-
ness of the transgender populations has once again been recognized.
The Supreme Court cautioned the government against blind reli-
ance on mathematical formulae to determine a backward class and
urged the State to discover backwardness in the “historical injus-
tice”111 and “under protection”112 of the transgender community
which, in the opinion of the Court, certainly entitles them to State
affirmative action under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.
VI. VALID POINTS IN THE CLARIFICATION PETITION
There are some other concerns raised by the Clarification Peti-
tion. In this section, I will address those concerns, for completeness.
1. The first clarification sought by the petition is whether the
term “third gender” is to be used for the purposes of identifying just
Hijra persons or will it be used to identify all transgender persons?113
To answer this question, a careful consideration of the entire trans-
gender judgment must be made. Upon reading the entire judgment
as a whole, it is clear that the Court understands that Hijra persons
(called variously Kinnar, Jogtas and Jogappas, Aravanis, etc.) neither
consider themselves biologically or psychologically male nor do they
109. Id. at 446–47.
110. Singh, (2015) 4 SCC at 697.
111. Id. at 729.
112. Id.
113. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 7.
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consider themselves women, as they cannot bear children and do not
menstruate.114 It is for this reason, the court states, they call them-
selves third gender, whereas other transgender persons, who do not
identify as Hijra (such as male-to-female transgenders [pre- or post-
operation], female-to-male transgenders [pre- or post-operation],
transsexuals, etc.) may not identify as third gender.115 To quote the
Supreme Court on this point:
Transgender is generally described as an umbrella term for per-
sons whose gender identity, gender expression or behaviour does
not conform to their biological sex. TG may also take in persons
who do not identify with their sex assigned at birth, which include
[H]ijras/[E]unuchs who, in this writ petition, describe them-
selves as “third gender” and they do not identify as either male
or female. Hijras are not men by virtue of anatomy appearance and
psychologically, they are also not women, though they are like
women with no female reproduction organ and no menstruation.
Since [H]ijras do not have reproduction capacities as either men
or women, they are neither men nor women and claim to be an
institutional “third gender.”116
The Court rightly understands the word transgender as an um-
brella term, finding that Hijra persons are included within this term.
It is to the Hijra persons that the term “third gender” applies and
this understanding is in line with the current understanding of the
term “transgender.”117
Not all transgender persons think of themselves as neither men
nor women.118 Some transgender people do want to identify as either
a man or woman, depending on their deeply felt gender identity.119
It would not be right—both in terms of their lived experience and
also in terms of the judgment which finds a fundamental right to
identify in self-defined gender—to compel such persons to identify
as third gender. This understanding is reflected in the final direc-
tions of the Court to the Centre and the States:
(1) Hijras, [E]unuchs, apart from binary genders, be treated as
“third gender” for the purpose of safeguarding their rights under
Part III of our Constitution and the laws made by Parliament
and the State Legislature.
114. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 442–43.
115. Id. at 443.
116. Id. at 462.
117. Id. at 443.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 442–44, 465.
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(2) Transgender persons’ right to decide their self-identified gender
is also upheld and the Centre and State Governments are di-
rected to grant legal recognition of their gender identity such as
male, female or as third gender.120
A reading of these two directions means that whereas Hijra
persons can be treated as third gender they can also identify, if they
so wish, as male or female. This is because the definition of
transgender includes Hijras. Similarly, for transgender persons who
are not Hijras, the Court has recognized their right to identify as
male, female, or third gender. The thrust of the judgment is on the
fundamental right to self-defined gender identification121 and when
understood in this way, the mandate of these directions is to freely
allow transgender and Hijra persons to choose the gender with
which they want to identify. Reading the directions in part and
separate from its spirit offends the jurisprudence set forth therein.
For the purposes of legal recognition (in identity cards and forms),
the government should therefore, allow transgender and Hijra
persons to decide whether they want to identify as male, female, or
third gender.
2. The Clarif ication Petition states that the judgment uses the
word “eunuch” to denote Hijra and transgender persons.122 It states
that this term is derogatory and it must be done away with.123 This,
indeed, is a valid point raised by the petition. The term “eunuch” is
used to denote a castrated male.124 Not all Hijra or transgender
persons are castrated.125 In fact, castration has no necessary connec-
tion with being a transgender or Hijra person. Both the Supreme
Court judgment and authoritative anthropological research has
found that most of the male-to-female transgender persons and Hijra
persons are born biologically male and have the full functioning of
their sex organs.126 Hijra are a distinct socio-religious cultural group
with their own custom and initiation rituals.127 Not all male to
female transgender persons join this community. Quoted partially,
the definition of the Hijra adopted by the Supreme Court states,
“Hijras are biological males who reject their ‘masculine’ identity in
120. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 508.
121. Id. at 490.
122. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 2.
123. Id. at 7–9.
124. Id. at 7–8.
125. Id.
126. See SERENA NANDA, NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HIJRAS OF INDIA, at xx (2nd
ed. 1999).
127. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 480–81.
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due course of time to identify either as women, or ‘not-men,’ or ‘in-
between man and woman,’ or ‘neither man nor woman.’ ”128
This definition is a well-accepted definition of the term “Hijra.”
Serena Nanda in her authoritative work Neither Man Nor Woman
has also alluded to the fact that most Hijras are biologically male.129
3. The third point that the Clarification Petition raises is that
the Court has defined “transgender” to include even lesbians, gays,
and bisexuals.130 Such a broad definition confuses the scope of the
directions issued to the government.131 This objection is indeed true.
At various points, the Court has defined transgender to include
lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. In paragraph twenty-two of the lead
judgment, the judge states that “Sexual orientation includes trans-
gender and gender-variant people with heavy sexual orientation and
their sexual orientation may or may not change during or after
gender transmission, which also includes homosexuals, bisexuals,
heterosexuals, asexual, etc.”132 Likewise, the concurring judgment
states that, “At the outset, it may be clarified that the term ‘trans-
gender’ is used in a wider sense, in the present age. Even gay,
lesbian, bisexual are included by the descriptor ‘transgender.’ ”133
To be sure, the Court has, fairly consistently, maintained a clear
definition of the term transgender:
Transgender is generally described as an umbrella term for
persons whose gender identity, gender expression or behaviour
does not conform to their biological sex. TG may also take in per-
sons who do not identify with their sex assigned at birth, which
include [H]ijras/[E]unuchs who, in this writ petition, describe
themselves as “third gender” and they do not identify as either
male or female. Hijras are not men by virtue of anatomical appear-
ance and psychologically, they are also not women, though they
are like women with no female reproduction organ and no men-
struation. Since [H]ijras do not have reproduction capacities as
either men or women, they are neither men nor women and
claim to be an institutional “third gender”. Among [H]ijras, there
are emasculated (castrated, nirvana) men, non-emasculated men
(not castrated/akva/akka) and inter-sexed persons (hermaphro-
dites). TG also includes persons who intend to undergo sex re-
assignment surgery (SRS) or have undergone SRS to align their
128. Id. at 480.
129. See NANDA, supra note 126, at xx.
130. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 11.
131. See id. at 11–12, 19–20.
132. Nat’l Legal Servs. Auth., (2014) 5 SCC at 465.
133. Id. at 501.
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biological sex with their gender identity in order to become male
or female. They are generally called transsexual persons. Further,
there are persons who like to cross-dress in clothing of opposite
gender i.e. transvestites. Resultantly, the term “transgender,” in
contemporary usage, has become an umbrella term that is used
to describe a wide range of identities and experiences, including
but not limited to pre-operative, post-operative and non-operative
transsexual people, who strongly identify with the gender oppo-
site to their biological sex: male and female.134
The above-mentioned deviation from the definition has the
capacity to confuse the judgment and the scope of the applicability
of the directions. In the wake of this judgment, the Rights of Trans-
gender Persons Bill of 2014135 has been introduced and passed in the
Upper House of the Parliament in April 2015.136 This Bill provides
for both non-discrimination and welfare measures for transgender
persons; the definition section of the Bill defines a transgender
person with exclusive reference to their gender identity and does not
include a mention of sexual orientation such as lesbian, gay, or bi-
sexual.137 This definition section also includes gender-queers within
the definition of transgender.138 The Supreme Court definition of the
term does not include gender-queers. There is an urgent need for
the Supreme Court to clarify this definition and the Clarification
Petition is correct to consider it as a solution.
4. The next point that the Clarification Petition raises deals
with the intersectionality of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes and the other backward class category.139 The government
has argued that treating all transgender persons as a backward
class may give rise to potential conflict.140 Those persons who are
not Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may not have a problem
with being classified as other backward class but the Court does
need to clarify, and the Clarification Petition indeed asks it to
clarify, the status of the those transgender persons who are Sched-
uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Will they now be classified as an
‘other backward class’ or will they retain their Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe status? This is an important determination to be
134. Id. at 443.
135. The Rights of Transgender Persons Bill, 2014, No. XLIXC-C of 2014, RAJYA
SABHA, 2014.
136. Id.
137. Id. at ch. I, § 2(t).
138. Id.
139. Clarification Petition, supra note 5, at 13–14.
140. See id. at 13–14, 20–22.
606 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:585
made. The purpose of this Article is not to discuss the creation of the
constitutional category of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Suffice it to say that for the purpose of state affirmative action, the
President can, under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, cause
a list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to be created.141
State affirmative action provisions such as Article 15(4) and Article
16(4) apply to those classes mentioned in this list.142
Classification as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or
another backward class has telling repercussions on the eligibility
of affirmative actions. All backward classes include Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes but this is not true in the reverse. All
affirmative action programmes for the backward classes automati-
cally apply to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes but the re-
verse may not always be the case. For example, Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe persons are not excluded from affirmative action
programmes on the basis of a “creamy layer” determination,143 unlike
a person classified as a backward class who loses State affirmative
action support once they attain the “creamy layer.” Additionally, no
reservations can be made for backward classes in job promotions;
however, owing to a new constitutional amendment inserting Article
16(4A), reservations can be made for Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes in job promotions.144 Moreover, Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes have reserved seats in the legislature but back-
ward classes do not have this provision.145 Classification as Sched-
uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or backward classes has a real
impact on the nature of state affirmative action. It is indeed impor-
tant for the Supreme Court to clarify what will happen to Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe transgender persons—will they all now
be classified as a backward class or will they retain their original
classification—that of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe?
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has directed the Centre and the State
Governments to include transgender persons in the backward class
list with the objective of providing to them several affirmative action
measures. The Union of India has, in response, stated that it does
not have the competence to suo motu make this inclusion unless the
141. INDIA CONST. arts. 341(1), 342(1).
142. INDIA CONST. arts. 15(4), 16(4).
143. Thakur, (2008) 6 SCC at 249.
144. INDIA CONST. art. 16(4A).
145. See INDIA CONST. art. 330.
2016] CLARIFICATION PETITION: INCORRECT AND IN BAD FAITH 607
National Commission for Backward Classes makes a recommendation
directing them to do so. I have tried to demonstrate through this
Article that not only is this argument an incorrect reading of the
constitutional guarantee to equality and the National Commission
of Backward Classes Act, it is also a position that the Union has in
the recent past argued against. Moreover, the NCBC can only decide
claims of over inclusion and under inclusion in the backward class
list for the purposes of providing reservations in job appointments
as per Article 16(4). The scope of the Act does not extend to deciding
the veracity of the socially and educationally backward class list
prepared by the State for the purposes of providing other affirma-
tive action measures under Article 15(4). Article 15(4) special provi-
sions have a wider scope than job reservation in Article 16(4). The
Supreme Court in the Sawhney case stated clearly that backward
classes for the purpose of Article 15(4) and 16(4) are different.146 The
State, therefore, has the power to declare which classes of citizens
will qualify as socially and educationally backward classes of citi-
zens for the purpose of Article 15(4).
The Supreme Court has stated that transgender persons should
be included in the backward class list owing to their social back-
wardness. The State, if it does not do so, opens itself up to challenge
not only before the NCBC (under Section 9) but also before the
Supreme Court.147
146. Sawhney, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC at 719–20.
147. Singh, (2015) 4 SCC at 729–30.

